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After the discovery of “population” in modern society, domination over the body has been 
enacted by a set of interventions which are called regulatory control, or bio-politics by Michel 
Foucault. From the eighteenth century onwards, bio-politics has involved any kind of 
intervention which acts as means for forming the population according to the wills of those 
with power. This has led to an era of bio-politics in which fertility in particular has become 
regulated in accordance with political economy. Hence the body, especially the female body, 
has been reduced to an economic object by detaching her identity, personal aspirations and 
desires. In turn, sexuality becomes a subject of economic interventions through pronatalist 
and/or antinatalist politics. In either way, those interventions should be methodologically 
regarded as instruments of bio-politics. This paper specifically focuses on pronatalist and 
antinatalist politics as bio-political instruments in the well-known Romanian case and the 
Chinese case by drawing upon the Foucauldian perspective of bio-politics. 
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Introduction 
Three basic dynamics of demographic change are birth, death and migration. Among 
those, birth and migration are specifically the ones that are determined by individual 
decisions, but are also formed by several political implications on a macro level. The 
levels at which these dynamics appear and the kind of tendencies they exhibit is 
accomplished through the domination of bodies and the means of power. Foucault 
(1978) notes that since the eighteenth century power, which had previously been 
formed through the threat of death, began to be exercised by dominating the bodies 
of people. According to him, there are two ways to dominate bodies. The first one is 
called anatomo-politics, which means disciplining the body and making it obedient 
by increasing its abilities and utility. The second, which was formed later, is the 
discovery of the body as the foundation of the biological processes. Thus, it refers to 
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“propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, 
with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected 
through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the 
population” (ibid: p.139). What Foucault (1992: p.109) pointed out was that with the 
emerging concept of bio-politics in the eighteenth century, governments have tried 
to rationalize questions about the living community as a population, a newly 
significant phenomenon. It is now the case that population statistics serve as an 
epistemological entity for the attempts of governments to regulate a population. 
Population statistics are built on the basis of the idea that “one body comes to equal 
another, that each death, birth, marriage, divorce and so on, comes to be equivalent 
of any other” (Curtis, 2002: p.529). It may be argued that exercising bio-politics and 
the discovery of the population are related since bio-politics can only be mobilized 
by gathering those population statistics. Thus, defining a population as an 
aggregation of individuals by taking the individuals as collective abstractions 
(Kligman, 1998: p.11) facilitates employing the coercive means of bio-politics. 
Bio-politics may be understood as any attempt to regulate the population according 
to the demands of the government. A variety of techniques to control the population, 
having an effect on fertility, as well as on a set of demographic dynamics such as 
longevity, immigration, etc., are employed. Thus, the “bio-power” era begins 
(Foucault, 1978: p.140). In the era of bio-power, attempts are made to regulate 
fertility according to the political economy in which governments are engaging. The 
body, especially the female body, is degraded to an economic object by being 
detached from her individual identity, personal aspirations and desires. In a very 
general sense, being located at the junction of the ‘body’ and the ‘population’ for 
Foucault, sex displaces the former forms of power which had been sustained through 
the threat of destruction of the body, and now becomes the means and the ends of a 
power which is sustained through the regulation of the body. Thus, sexuality comes 
to be the theme of pronatalist or antinatalist policies undertaken by economic 
interventions (ibid: p.147).  
Whether policies are pronatalist, and encourage an increase in population growth or 
they are antinatalist and aimed at limiting it, all initiatives for population regulation 
may be seen as a means for bio-politics if they are to establish a form of control over 
the body. This study is an attempt to display why and how Romania’s harsh 
experience in accelerating population growth through increasing fertility in the 
1960s, and China’s antinatalist population policies following in quite the opposite 
direction between 1979-2016, should be seen as examples of these means through a 
Foucauldian perspective. First, the definitions of pronatalist and antinatalist policies 
will be discussed. Second, the development of pronatalist policies in Romania will 
be examined, categorizing it into two periods, the periods before and after the year 
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1966 when the Decree No. 770 was put into force. Third, the course of China's 
antinatalist population policy, which was initiated in 1979 and was been 
implemented until 2015, will be introduced into the discussion. Finally, a conclusion 
will analyze the regulation and the control of populations exercised in different 
historical periods in the two countries. By reviewing the literature written on the two 
cases, the paper aims methodologically at revealing whether the population policies, 
with specific regard to those concerning fertility, may be considered to be the means 
of bio-politics from a Foucauldian view.  
Pronatalist and Antinatalist Policies 
“Pronatalist society is one in which people believe that married couples should 
reproduce or should want to reproduce” (Newman & Grauerholz, 2002: p.327). In a 
pronatalist society people also have pronatalist values: for instance, a woman’s very 
presence in the society is through giving birth. Indeed, both women’s and men’s 
societal status are mostly determined in that way. On the other hand, voluntarily 
childless couples are regarded as threats to society for dislocating the long-
established values (ibid).  
Unlike pronatalism, antinatalism refers to a logic that reproduction should be limited 
for the common good of a society. By discouraging population growth, antinatalist 
policies of today aim at increasing the per capita income (Fanti & Gori, 2009). 
Although antinatalist claims have now moved far away from a Malthusian 
apocalyptic vision, the idea behind them still relies upon the fact that too many 
people are hard to be supported for economic, social and environmental reasons. 
Accordingly, the idea can also be vigorously adopted by those individuals who 
believe that fewer children would be more manageable, both financially and socially, 
at the micro scale. In addition to the structural factors driven by modernization and 
urbanization, ideational changes bring forth a fertility decline in developed societies 
where individualism prevails. Van de Kaa (1989: p.11) explains this ideational 
change as a “shift from the era of the king-child with parents to that of the king-pair 
with a child”. Concomitantly, total fertility rates1 have begun to fall well below the 
replacement fertility2 level in most of the developed world. Despite the fact that 
                                                          
1 “The expected number of children a woman who survives to the end of the reproductive age 
span will have during her lifetime if she experiences the given age-specific rates”. 
Reference: United Nations. 2003. Handbook on the Collection of Fertility and Mortality 
Data. 16 September 2017. <http://data.un.org/Glossary.aspx?q=total+fertility+rate>. 
 
2 Every two children born will replace their mother and father. However, because of a risk 
for dying before reaching fertile age and the sex ratio imbalance at birth (1,05), an extra ratio 
of 0,1 is needed. 
 24  Pelin Önder Erol 
 
fertility decline is not supported by the states in the developed world through 
antinatalist policies, antinatalism as a way of life predominates in individualistic 
societies. Fertility decline in developed countries is an outcome of a statistical 
aggregation of rational and voluntary behaviors of singular individuals, but not an 
outcome of enforced policies. 
Pronatalist and antinatalist values, akin to all other values related to fertility, are 
shared and should be considered immaterial elements of culture. Attitudes and 
behaviors regarding fertility are products of diffusion in a sense. These orientations 
can be explained through diffusion theory, which may briefly be defined as “a 
perspective which maintains that the role of social interaction on fertility-related 
decisions is particularly important” (Önder Erol, 2011: p.22). According to a group 
of diffusion theorists, in societies speaking the same language, values, attitudes and 
behaviors concerning fertility are shared commonly (Johnson-Hanks, 2008: p.305). 
And it is also a correlate in diffusion theory that whether a society holds pronatalist 
or antinatalist values is a social construct. 
On the other hand, a government’s decision about following pronatalist or 
antinatalist policy may be irrelevant for fertility-related values of the society in 
question. For example, in some of the Eastern European countries, pronatalist 
policies, which have used a variety of practices ranging from incentives like 
lengthened paid maternity leave, family allowances, cash birth grants, access to new 
housing, and new taxes for childless couples (McIntyre, 1975: p.367) to serious 
disincentives like abortion bans, should be considered to be attempts to increase birth 
rates. Birth rates aimed at by pronatalist policies are higher than the replacement leve 
of fertility, which is a total fertility rate of 2.1 child per woman. It is only when this 
rate is exceeded that population growth can be achieved. As for antinatalist policies, 
as in the specific case of Chinese antinatalist policy, couples have been restricted to 
having only one child. Especially in the urban areas of China, couples who had more 
than one child had to face “loss of access to schools, medical care, factory jobs, 
housing, and social welfare” (Basten & Jiang, 2014: p.494). The targeted fertility 
rate was 1.0, a rate which is below the replacement level, and a population decline 
in the long run was inevitable. To repeat, it may not be possible to draw a 
correspondence between the level a society holds pronatalist or antinatalist values 
and the likelihood of the government enforcing pronatalist/antinatalist policies. 
Therefore, when legislations and policies concerning reproduction are based on 
abstract ideological principles rather than socio-economic circumstances that affect 
                                                          
Reference: Rowland, D. T. Demographic Methods and Concepts, United Kingdom: Oxford 
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humans’ quality of life, the resulting outcomes can be tragic, especially for women 
and children (Kligman, 1998: p.2). Romania, as one of the Eastern European 
countries influenced by Soviet communism, argued that its success could only 
become possible with women’s emancipation (Lenin, 2000: p.193-206). Yet it 
adopted the most stringent pronatalist policy between 1966 and 1989. The case of 
Romania is full of contradictions. In fact, in this era a set of problems developed in 
Romania, including an increase in the risk of maternal mortality due to abortion and 
an increase in the number of unwanted babies. Likewise, implementations in China, 
the outcomes of which are similar to those of the Romanian case but through 
different ways, caused a set of problems concerning the demographic structure which 
can only be revealed in the long-run, at the macro level. On the other hand, they also 
brought about tragic effects on individuals and families, at the micro level.  
The Development of Pronatalist Policies in Romania 
The overall trend of fertility decline in Europe began to be considered a problem as 
a labor force came to be needed. This was especially the case for the Eastern 
European countries that were aiming at rapid industrialization in the post-World War 
II period (Moskoff, 1980: p.597). Among European countries, Romania especially 
responded to this pressure in the 1960s with a set of extreme government 
interventions to boost fertility. Romania then experienced a baby boom just after the 
pronatalist policy had begun to be effectively implemented. This may be examined 
as two successive periods, the first of which is the period before those policies were 
put into force (pre-1966) and the second of which is the period during when those 
policies were strictly being exercised (between 1966 and 1989).  
a. Pre-1966 Period 
Fertility rates in Europe began to fall in the late 1800s. With an accompanying 
mortality decline, a demographic transition had begun in Western Europe. Although 
traditional birth control methods had been extensively used by the general public 
during the demographic transition (Szreter, Nye & van Poppel: 2003), innovation, 
improvement and proliferation of modern contraceptive techniques played an 
important role in the fertility decline. This was because they served as an alternative 
and effective way for couples to limit the number of children they had, if they so 
desired.  
Adoption of birth control methods by couples was mostly due to changes in social 
and economic structure. With industrialization and migration from rural to urban 
areas, the child is no longer considered to be an economic asset (Caldwell, 1976; 
2005) and an old-age security (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1982). Another factor related to 
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structural differentiation is that the educational status of women had risen, and 
therefore they occupied a higher share of the urban labor force.  
Moreover, as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2004) noted, the demands of women to 
expand the scope of their power and to be emancipated from domestic roles enabled 
them to be individualized. This ideational change caused women, and even men, in 
Europe to have fewer children. In modern society self-identities have significant 
effects upon family and fertility behaviors. Reproduction in a reflexive modernity, 
compared to that in the pre-modern era when reproduction is highly associated with 
fate, becomes a matter of multiple choices (Giddens, 2010: p.273). Therefore, 
standard biographies are replaced by self-reflexive biographies in which individuals 
have to make their own decisions concerning the issues such as education, 
occupation, spouse and the number of desired children (Beck, 2014: p.205).  
In Eastern European countries, fertility decline occurred for similar reasons. The 
share of the female labor force in Western countries has risen since World War II; 
the largest increase has been observed among married women (Giddens, 2010). 
According to Macura (1974), the fact that women gained higher prestige due to their 
increased share in labor force caused fertility to decline in the post-war period. 
Overall development, including mass education, has raised the educational level of 
women, as well as of the whole population. Concomitantly, this led to lower birth 
rates in the developing world, including Romania (Moskoff, 1980). In fact, according 
to research carried out in urban Bucharest in the 1960s, the desired number of 
children was 1,3 on average; whereas it was 0,7 for the women with higher education 
(Mehlan, 1966, as cited in Besemeres, 1980: p.37). Also, in this period, that women 
began to be employed in the urban industrial sector in socialist countries is another 
important factor for a fertility decline in the Eastern Europe. Following this shared 
pattern, Romania lead among the Eastern European countries, in that female labor 
was extensively utilized. In addition, the majority of families were in need of the 
financial contribution made by women to the household income (Moskoff, 1980). 
Intensive participation of women in the labor force caused a decline in fertility for 
several practical reasons. The question of who would take care of the children was 
the foremost one. Given that the state could not provide any solution to this problem; 
and the reduced grand-parenting role in childcare due to the dissolution of the 
extended family, women had some concerns about having more children (ibid). 
Women, who used up their energy after long working hours, had been considering 
that they might be unable to perform their affective roles. Therefore, they avoided 
having more children, knowing that they would feel the double burden otherwise. 
On the other hand, under harsh economic circumstances the income they provided 
was necessary. Briefly, in the Romanian case, while women were invited into 
working life, a significant reality was overlooked: If women were supposed to work 
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intensively for the sake of the rapid industrialization, then social policies, such as 
providing childcare and hence reducing the double burden on women, should had 
been put into practice. 
Throughout the pre-1966 period, Romania attempted to spur its economic 
development by transferring its agricultural labor force into an industrial one. As a 
part of the socialist ideology to press equal participation of both sexes into 
employment, economic planners had recommended that the female labor force 
should be integrated into the Romanian economy. “To facilitate the projects aimed 
at radical social change, the young communist government needed first to destroy 
the institutions, norms, and values of the preceding system. It thus took aim at 
traditional family structures” (Kligman, 1998: p.23). This was followed by a set of 
practices to enlarge the scope of freedom for family planning through a set of 
programs such as making contraceptive techniques and abortion available to all. 
However, the economic program of the period caused indirect and unforeseen 
consequences, including a rapid fertility decline (Kligman, 1998; Moskoff, 1980). In 
fact, in Romania the crude birth rate,3 which had been 24,2 in 1956, fell to 14,3 
within as short a period as a decade (Berelson, 1979; Moskoff, 1980). Undoubtedly, 
this sharp decline was due mostly to liberalizing access to abortion in 1957. Actually, 
from that year on, until 1966, the year when Decree number 770 was introduced, 
abortion was the primary birth control method employed (Moskoff, 1980, Berelson, 
1979; Teitelbaum, 1972; Legge & Alford, 1986). 
b. The Period of a Strict Pronatalist Policy (1966-1989) 
Lowered fertility has dominated both Western and Eastern Europe in the post-war 
period. Although in both regions, the idea that fertility decline might be a threat to 
the economy was shared, the ways in which they managed it were significantly 
different (Legge & Alford, 1986). Democratic governments consider reproduction 
to be a matter of individual choice and prioritize choice over demographic policies 
that are planned for governmental interests (McIntosh, 1983 as cited in Legge & 
Alford, 1986). In other words, reproduction in democratic countries occurs in a way 
that sexuality is associated with personal fulfillment, which is defined by Giddens 
(2005: p.125) as “effective individualism”. On the other hand, as can be seen from 
                                                          
3 “A vital statistics summary rate based on the number of live births occurring in a 
population during a given period of time, usually a calendar year, i.e., the number of live 
births occurring among the population of a given geographical area during a given year, 
per 1,000 mid-year total population of the given geographical area during the same year”.  
Reference: United Nations. 2001. Principles and Recommendations for a Vital 
Statistics System, Revision 2 2001, 19 October 2017. 
<http://data.un.org/Glossary.aspx?q=crude+birth+rate>. 
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the Romanian case that this study partly focuses on, authoritarian states of Eastern 
Europe in this period adopted ways of regulating the fertility behavior of their 
citizens through exercising bio-power. 
According to Besemeres (1980: p.262), states can follow three possible ways to 
intervene in population policies. First, policies may be economic measures such as 
family benefits, or maternity and childcare leaves. The second group of strategies is 
made up of moral propaganda campaigns through mass media and organizations. 
And the third group of strategies is composed of legal-administrative measures, such 
as legal incentives and disincentives with regard to birth control mechanisms. 
According to this classification, the methods followed by Romania in the post-1966 
period were legal-administrative strategies rather than economic and moral ones. In 
other words, Romania aimed at increasing birth rates through direct interventions 
into female bodies, instead of making an ideational change in fertility behavior 
through articulating encouraging discourses or providing family supports. In short, 
the means of pronatalist policy of Romania of this period were marked by coercion 
and oppression.  
The government had suddenly begun to take quite an opposite tack in its quest for 
an economic growth. Instead of employing the available female labor force, the 
government sought natural population growth as the prerequisite for industrialization 
and economic development, and had targeted a population reaching 25 billion by 
1990 and 30 billion by 2000 (Trebici, 1976 as cited in Berelson, 1979). The 
expectation was that a younger and larger population would mean a greater labor 
force. This is an exact example of what Foucault (1992, p. 110) identifies as “the 
reason of the state”. By this, he argues that the state grows stronger through 
population growth. Throughout the construction of socialism, reproduction of a labor 
force had been of particularly great importance (Kligman, 1998: p.7). Because the 
younger population, which was expected to constitute the labor force, had 
increasingly been shrinking, the Romanian government initiated a set of programs 
to reverse the declining fertility trends. In these programs, constraints about the use 
of contraceptive methods and an abortion ban were the major measures. In addition, 
some complementary measures, such as maternity leave, rewarding children-rich 
women with medals, tax reductions and payments, obstructions to divorce, were also 
taken.  
With Decree number 770, the abortion ban, which had a distinctive role in population 
policy in Romania, was introduced on November 1st, 1966. However, the decree did 
exclude women who had already borne more than four children, who had conceived 
through an assault, whose birth-giving had been considered to be medically 
unfavorable, or who were determined to be physically, psychologically and 
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emotionally ineligible for children. . Outside of these exemptions, doctors who 
performed abortions and women who sought them might have been sentenced to 
penalties (David, 1970 as cited in Legge & Alford, 1986). The president of the 
period, Ceausescu, stated that “it is every healthy Romanian woman’s patriotic duty 
to have four children” (Legge & Alford, 1986: p.725) and added that “the fetus is the 
property of the entire society. Anyone who avoids having children is a deserter who 
abandons the laws of national continuity” (Breslau, 1990 as cited in Newman & 
Grauerholz, 2002: p.328). According to Kligman (1998: p.7), Ceausescu was 
instrumentalizing the female body in order to realize his goals.  
Briefly, the consequences of the decree were very severe. A great many women 
suffered from self-induced abortions and orphanages overflowed with unwanted and 
unhealthy babies (Newman & Grauerholz, 2002: p.328). In addition, a rapidly 
emerging cohort would require more resources for schooling, shelter and 
employment. Given the fact that these are state-provided facilities, an appropriate 
economic plan should have been introduced by the state well before the initialization 
of the population policy. Moreover, the crude birth rate, which had been 14,3 before 
1966, has increased to 27,4 within a year. Especially during the two years following 
the decree, a significant decline in the number of legal abortions was observed. 
However, this decline was limited to the years when a rigid control over abortions 
was implemented. As a result, the crude birth rate fell again to 18,4, a rate which was 
close to the rates of other Eastern European countries where restrictions over birth 
control methods and abortion ban did not exist. 
 
The Development of Antinatalist Policies in China 
“China’s population grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the 1970s it had 
increased by some 250 million since the founding of People’s Republic” (Basten & 
Jiang, 2014: p.493). High fertility and declining mortality together accounted for the 
rapid population growth. Mortality decline occurred especially among children and 
younger adults (Peng, 2011). As demographic transition theory has shown 
elsewhere, such a combination of high fertility and low mortality would cause a 
population to boom and to continue to grow until fertility rates begin to decline. As 
a matter of fact, the demographic annual growth rate of China was more than 2% 
between the 1950s and the 1970s (ibid: p.581). In response to such growth, the 
“Chinese government was involved in birth planning in the 1950s” (Riley, 2004: 
p.11).  
It should also be kept in mind that during the initial period of the foundation of 
People’s Republic of China, population growth was desired in order to gain political 
 30  Pelin Önder Erol 
 
strength and to provide a labor force. Soon after, however, in the mid-1950s, the 
government reversed its position in seeking development in economic and health 
realms (ibid, p. 11). In fact, “China was an example of the contradiction between 
rhetoric and action evident in Bucharest”, where the first World Population 
Conference organized by the United Nations was held (Feng, Gu & Cai, 2012: 
p.116). In the conference held in 1974, the Chinese delegation pronounced an anti-
imperialist and anti-colonialist attitude towards super-powers with respect to 
development (Demeny, 1985: pp.99-100), despite the fact that at the same time in 
China “a nationwide birth control program was already well underway” (Feng et al., 
2012: p.117).  
The birth control program of the 1970s included “restrictions on family size, late 
marriage and childbearing, and the spacing of children” (Hesketh, Lu & Xing, 2005: 
p.1171). This was also known as the wan xi shao or “fewer, later, longer” campaign, 
which was undertaken through mass propaganda (Nie & Wyman, 2005: p.315), 
throughout the 1970s (Greenhalgh & Bongaarts, 1987). Because of the economic 
stagnation of the Cultural Revolution in China, the Chinese government launched a 
one-child policy. In the aftermath of Mao’s leadership, economic development was 
determined to be the fundamental basis of the new leadership’s political legitimacy. 
The main concern was to increase per capita GDP growth (Feng et al., 2012: p.118). 
In 1979, the official Chinese news outlet reported that couples would be allowed to 
have one child, with at most two (Feng et al., 2012: p.118). The one-child policy was 
announced in the Open Letter to the members of the Communist Party of China and 
the Communist Youth League (Feng et al., 2012; Basten & Jiang, 2014). The 
government’s birth planning policies became more restrictive in the 1980s (Riley, 
2004: p.11). With the one-child policy, the Chinese government targeted a 
population of 1.2 billion by the year 2000 (Hesketh et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2012). 
The total fertility rate in China was about 5,8 in 1970; it dropped sharply to 2,8 in 
1979 (Peng, 2011: p.581), the year when the one-child policy was initiated. This 
would evidently mean that a considerable part of the fertility decline had already 
started before the government began to implement its family planning program. 
“Although the fertility rate had fallen to less than half that level by the late 1970s, in 
1979-1980 China introduced its one-child birth planning policy to reduce the 
country’s rapid population growth” (Nie & Wyman, 2005: p.313). Actually, fertility 
rates had already begun to decline as early as in the 1950s and the 1960s, probably 
because the government paid special attention to urban fertility, and because families 
themselves began to desire fewer children (Riley, 2004: p.11). The decline up until 
1979 was partly due to “advances in education, improvements in the position of 
women, and reductions in mortality” (Peng, 2011: p.582), which may be interpreted 
as a natural outcome of the modernization process. It is also widely discussed in the 
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literature that even without introducing such a policy, birth rates would naturally 
have fallen to the fertility level of other countries that had had birth rates similar to 
that of China before the policy was enacted (Feng et al., 2012; Hesketh, Zhou & 
Wang, 2015).  
However, only after the one-child policy was initiated did the total fertility rate drop 
below the replacement fertility level, which it did by the early 1990s (United Nations, 
2017). This decline appeared more gradually, and it stabilized at a total fertility rate 
of about 1,7 (Wang, 2003; as cited in Hesketh et al., 2005). The overall fertility 
decline that took place within a few decades in China is considered in the 
demographic literature to be the most rapid one ever observed in any human 
population (Lavely, 1984) and the government’s effort is considered as the most 
prominent effort to control population growth ever seen (Feng et al., 2012). “There 
is no doubt that government commitment, and the efficient and sometimes coercive 
implementation of the family planning program, were the major determinants of 
China’s rapid fertility decline” (Peng, 2011: p.581). 
The one-child policy was designed through a set of incentives and disincentives. 
These included educational opportunities, health care, housing and job assignments 
as rewards on the one hand, and punishments such as fines or no access to education 
and other privileges granted otherwise, on the other (Riley, 2004: p.12). It should 
also be noted that the one-child policy was limited basically to urban families and 
the majority of rural families were freer to have up to two children (Peng, 2011: 
p.582), especially if their first child was a girl and/or if the second child was born 
after five years (Hesketh et al., 2005: p.1171). In 1984 and 1985, birth planning 
policy began to be eased in part because of the success of the policies and the rapid 
shrinking of family size. This is evident in that the Central Committee changed the 
well-known population target for the year 2000 from 1.2 billion to “about” 1.2 billion 
(Greenhalgh & Bongaarts 1987: p.1167). By 1989, it was argued that the family 
planning policy of China had been relaxed to some extent (Yi, 1989). Moreover, 
Basten and Jiang (2014: p.494) state that due to the economic, social and 
demographic heterogeneity of China, most provinces and even the villages had been 
permitted to follow their own birth control implementations from the mid-1980s 
onward. 
According to Feng et al. (2012: p.115-116), China’s one-child policy was the most 
draconian government social engineering ever seen. They also argue that an 
examination of this intervention offers valuable lessons on the role of the politics in 
birth control. Before discussing the demographic consequences of the one-child 
policy, one tragic effect it produced upon individual lives should be pointed out: 
“More fundamentally, it is seen as an ill-conceived policy that has prevented Chinese 
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individuals and families from having the number of children they desire” (ibid: 
p.123). The Chinese one-child policy should be considered to be on the same plane 
with the Romanian pronatalist case, in that it is another form of intervention to 
human bodies - similar in terms of the effects upon individuals. Other long-lasting 
macro and micro demographic effects are discussed below.  
First of all, the policy caused a sex ratio imbalance in China. The sex ratio at birth4 
is normally about 105, the ration that China had in 1979. In the aftermath of the 
introduction of the one-child policy in 1979, the ratio displayed a steady increase to 
111 in 1987 and to 114 in 1989 (Yi, Ping, Boachang, Yi, Bohua & Yongpiing, 1993). 
It has also been argued that the sex ratio at birth in some rural parts of China was as 
high as 130 (Kang & Wang, 2003 as cited in Hesketh & Xing, 2006: p.13273). This 
is mostly due to sex-selective abortion (Coale & Banister, 1994; Attané, 2009) and 
underreported female births (Merli & Raftery, 2000).  
Secondly, the restriction on family size would mean that caregiving for the elderly 
would be a problem with long-lasting effects on Chinese families. Being a rapidly 
aging population due to low fertility and increasing life expectancy, the Chinese 
population is composed of a great number of old people who are in need of care. In 
fact, Chinese culture is noted for a care ethic which is known as filial piety. Chinese 
society relies on the family, instead of on welfare provisions of the state, for 
providing caregiving for the elderly. It is particularly the male adult children who 
are traditionally expected to support elderly parents in Chinese culture, although 
today children of both sexes are legally considered to be responsible for it 
(Greenhalgh & Bongaarts, 1987: p.1169). Written governmental policies and tax 
provisions encourage adult children to co-reside or keep aging parents nearby (Liu, 
2000: p.196). Problems in caring for the aging population are exacerbated by the fact 
that increasingly far fewer adult children will be available for elder care as a result 
of the one-child policy. Moreover, the unbalanced sex ratio may have some indirect 
effects on elder care within the family. Fewer eligible women could mean that more 
and more older males, who will remain unmarried throughout their life course, will 
lack family support and there will be “many more parents who will not have a 
daughter-in-law to care for them” (Zhang & Goza, 2006: p.153).  
Thirdly, it can also be speculated that maternal and neonatal mortality may increase 
due to the fact that “many deliveries of babies that have not been officially sanctioned 
occur at home without trained personnel” (Hesketh et al., 2005: p.1172). This is 
because families may avoid reporting births in order to have a right to register their 
-in name- only child. By drawing upon data from research conducted in Sichuan, Ni 
                                                          
4 The number of male live births for every 100 female live births. 
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and MacKay Rossignol (1994) argue, that the risk for maternal mortality is higher 
for the unregistered pregnancies and births, due to the fact that women with 
unregistered pregnancies avoid prenatal care and the deliveries may be attended by 
non-medical personnel, as a consequence of the one couple-one child policy. 
The one-child policy of China “has profoundly affected the lives of one-fifth of the 
world’s population for 35 years, at the most personal level of reproductive choice” 
(Hesketh et al., 2015: p.2619). Since January 1, 2016, the date the policy was ended, 
Chinese couples have been allowed to have two children (Feng, Gu & Cai, 2016).  
 
Conclusion 
With regard to the control of the body, employing any sort of bio-political means 
would mean that human will is ignored. The psychology and physiology of the body 
may be severely affected especially when these bio-political means are exercised in 
fertility-related processes. Clearly, coercive and oppressive fertility policies that 
governments enact may threaten human lives. This is true for both pronatalist and 
antinatalist policies. 
Interventions into human fertility through population policies may be regarded as 
bio-politics from a Foucauldian perspective. Humankind moved from an era when 
the body was disciplined by the threat of death to an era when the body is controlled 
by subtler and pseudo-humane policies. It must be noted here that Foucault’s bio-
political means should be categorized into two sets, as encouraging and coercive 
means. Democratic governments, such as in Scandinavian countries, which respect 
human will, may also employ bio-political means within comprehensive family 
policies (Güvenç & Karaman, 1991: p.105-188), however they do not attempt to 
dominate bodies. Likewise, since its foundation to today, population policies in 
Turkey have perpetually ensured the autonomy of the individual and the family. 
Besides, even in periods when population is of greater importance as an economic 
resource, Turkish population policies have never been based on coercion and 
oppression. Therefore, without exception, all of the population policies that have 
been enacted in different periods in Turkey may be regarded as encouraging policies. 
By contrast, reproduction as a personal concern was politicized by weakly 
democratic governments, as experienced in the cases of Romania and China for the 
periods discussed above. 
Foucault’s claim that control over the body in modern society with the discovery of 
the issue of “population” might be instantiated in governmental population policies. 
Especially when they are based on coercion and oppression, pronatalist and 
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antinatalist policies should be seen as bio-political means. From a Foucauldian view, 
this study is an attempt to reveal the consequences experienced through the 
pronatalist policies of Romania between 1966 and 1989 and the antinatalist policies 
of China between 1979 and 2016. Some implications for the individual cases and the 
overall effects of such population policies are drawn from this study. 
In Romania, a peculiar era began in 1966 when Decree number 770 was launched. 
The Ceausescu regime between 1966-1989, which had followed a pronatalist policy 
in the most restrictive way ever seen in world history, caused tragic effects on the 
Romanian population (Kligman, 1998: p.2). The policy and its effects became 
prominent through a set of strategies to control the body and specifically to regulate 
the reproductive behavior of individuals. An abortion ban, limited access to 
contraceptive techniques, and a set of incentives, such as extended maternity leaves, 
medals for children-rich women and family allowances were practical 
implementations of Romanian pronatalist approach. Among all of the pronatalist 
means, it was particularly the abortion ban that caused an increase in the number of 
maternal deaths. Indeed, the maternal mortality rate in 1989 in Romania reached a 
peak, the highest ever recorded in the European demographic history. The most 
important factor for maternal deaths was illegal abortions (ibid: p.8, 215). 
Throughout the years when access to contraceptive techniques was obstructed, if not 
totally banned, unwanted pregnancies led to unwanted babies, which in turn caused 
an enormous increase in the number of children left to orphanages. Being one of the 
Eastern European countries where development of the labor force was desired for an 
economic push in the post-war period, Romania succeed only for a limited period of 
time in reaching high fertility, despite of all of these measures taken. 
Although its goals were quite the opposite, the implications of China’s pronatalist 
policies are similar to those of antinatalist ones. For more than three decades, China 
witnessed an antinatalist program, by which couples were only allowed one child. 
The one-child policy was launched in 1979 and remained in force until 2016. Not 
only incentives, such as educational opportunities, health care, housing and job 
assignments were used; but also, disincentives, such as fines or restricted access to 
education and other privileges granted otherwise were put into effect in order to 
sustain the program. The policy had profound social, economic and demographic 
effects on the Chinese population. Although about 400 million births were prevented 
through the one-child policy, it has also been observed in the literature that in any 
case, even in the absence of the policy, fertility rates would have fallen. The already 
discussed negative consequences of the policy have been a rapidly aging population, 
shrinking support for the elderly, an increased risk for maternal and neonatal 
mortality and a sex ratio imbalance. The unbalanced sex ratio is mostly due to 
relinquishing female children, in a cultural setting where male children are cherished. 
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As a result, from 1970 onwards, the sex ratio at birth has steadily increased and China 
has the highest sex ratio at birth in the world today (United Nations, 2017). 
Besides the fact that when and how many children individuals desire to have is quite 
intimate, reproduction itself is a basic human right. The pronatalist and antinatalist 
policies of Romania and China politically blurred the borders between the public and 
private spheres, ideationally eroded human will and human agency, and vitally 
threatened the female body, the fetus and even the societal entity as a whole. 
 
References 
Attané, I. (2009) The Determinants of Discrimination Against Daughters in China: Evidence 
from a Provincial-Level Analysis. Population Studies 63 (1), 87-102.  
Basten, S. & Quanbao J. (2014) China’s Family Planning Policies: Recent Reforms and 
Future Prospects. Studies in Family Planning, 45 (4), 493-509. 
Beck, U. & Beck-Gernsheim E. (2004) The Normal Chaos of Love. Malden, Polity Press. 
Beck, U. (2014) Risk Toplumu: Başka Bir Modernliğe Doğru. İstanbul, İthaki Yayınları. 
Berelson, B. (1979) Romania's 1966 Anti-Abortion Decree: The Demographic Experience 
of the First Decade. Population Studies 33 (2), 209-222. 
Besemeres, J. F. (1980) Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications of 
Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe. New York, M.E. Sharpe 
Inc., White Plains. 
Caldwell, J. C. (2005) On Net Intergenerational Wealth Flows: An Update. Population and 
Development Review 31 (4), 721-740. 
Caldwell, J. C. (1976) Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory. Population 
and Development Review 2 (3-4), 321-366.  
Coale, A. J. & Banister J. (1994) Five Decades of Missing Females in China. Demography 
31(3), 459-479. 
Curtis, B. (2002) Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery. 
The Canadian Journal of Sociology 27(4), 505-533. 
Demeny, P. (1985) Bucharest, Mexico City, and Beyond. Population and Development 
Review 11 (1), 99-106. 
Fanti, L. & Gori L. (2009) Population and Neoclassical Economic Growth: A New Child 
Policy Perspective. Economics Letters 104 (1), 27-30.  
Feng, W., Gu B. & Cai Y. (2016) The End of China’s One-Child Policy. Studies in Family 
Planning 47 (1), 83–86. 
Feng, W., Cai Y. & Gu B. (2012) Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge 
China’s One-Child Policy? Population and Development Review 38 (Supplement), 
115–129.  
Foucault, M. (1992) Ders Özetleri: 1970-1982. (Trans. Selâhattin Hilav). İstanbul, Yapı 
Kredi Yayınları.  
Foucault, M. (1978) The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. New York, 
Pantheon Books. 
Giddens, A. (2010) Modernite ve Bireysel Kimlik: Geç Modern Çağda Benlik ve Toplum. 
(Trans. Ümit Tatlıcan) İstanbul, Say Yayınları. 
Giddens, A. (2005) Sosyoloji: Kısa Fakat Eleştirel Bir Giriş. (Trans. Ülgen Yıldız Battal) 
Ankara, Phoenix Yayınevi. 
 36  Pelin Önder Erol 
 
Greenhalgh, S. & Bongaarts J. (1987) Fertility Policy in China: Future Options. Science, New 
Series 235. 4793, 1167-72. 
Güvenç, N. & Karaman L. (1991) Kapsamlı Aile Politikaları Uygulayan Ülkeler: İsveç Aile 
Politikaları: Karşılaştırmalı Ülkeler Panoraması. Ankara, T.C. Başbakanlık Aile 
Araştırmaları Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 105-118.  
Hesketh, T. & Xing Z. W. (2006) Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and 
Consequences. PNAS 103. 36, 13271–13275. 
Hesketh, T., Lu L., & Xing Z. W. (2005) “The Effect of China’s One-Child Family Policy 
after 25 Years.” New England Journal of Medicine 353, 1171-1176. 
Hesketh, T., Zhou X. & Wang Y. (2015) The End of the One-Child Policy: Lasting 
Implications for China. Journal of the American Medical Association, 314. 24, 
2619-2620. 
Johnson-Hanks, J. (2008) Demographic Transitions and Modernity. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 37, 301-315. 
Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1982) The Changing Value of Children in Turkey (Papers of The East-West 
Population Institute No: 60). Honolulu, Hawaii, East West Center. 
Kligman, G. (1998) The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s 
Romania. USA, University of California Press. 
Lavely, W. R. (1984) The Rural Chinese Fertility Transition: A Report from Shifang Xian, 
Sichuan. Population Studies 38 (3), 365-384.  
Legge, J. S., & Alford J.R. (1986) Can Government Regulate Fertility? An Assessment of 
Pronatalist Policy in Eastern Europe. The Western Political Quarterly 39 (4), 709-
728. 
Lenin, V. (2000) Marksizm, Kadın ve Aile. (Trans. Ömer Ünalan) Ankara, Bilim ve 
Sosyalizm Yayınları.  
Liu, W. T. (2000) Values and Caregiving Burden: The Significance of Filial Piety in Elder 
Care. Who Should Care for the Elderly: An East-West Value Divide. (Eds. William 
T. Liu and Hal Kendig). Singapore, Singapore University Press, 183-199. 
Macura, M. (1974) Population Policies in Socialist Countries of Europe. Population Studies 
28(3), 369-379. 
McIntryre, R. J. (1975) Pronatalist Programmes in Eastern Europe. Soviet Studies 27 (3), 
366-380. 
Merli, M. G. & Raftery A.E. (2000) Are Births Underreported in Rural China? Manipulation 
of Statistical Records in Response to China’s Population Policies. Demography 37 
(1), 109-126. 
Moskoff, W. (1980) Pronatalist Policies in Romania. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 28 (3), 597-614. 
Newman, D. & Grauerholz L. (2000) Sociology of Families. London, Sage Publications. 
Ni, H. & MacKay Rossignol, A. (1994) Maternal Deaths Among Women with Pregnancies 
Outside of Family Planning in Sichuan, China. Epidemiology 5 (5), 490-494. 
Nie, Y. & Wyman R. J. (2005) The One-Child Policy in Shanghai: Acceptance and 
Internalization. Population and Development Review 31(2), 313–336. 
Önder Erol, P. (2011) Sosyolojik Perspektiften Demografik Yaşlanma: Toplumsal, 
Ekonomik ve Politik Alanlarda Yaşlı Failliği. Unpublished Diss. (Ph.D. Thesis). 
Ege Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. 
Peng, X. (2011) China’s Demographic History and Future Challenges. Science 333. 6042, 
581-587. 
Riley, N. E. (2004) China’s Population: New Trends and Challenges. Population Bulletin 59 
(2), 1-38. 
 
Population Policy as a Means for Bio-Politics: The Cases of Romania and China 37 
 
Szreter, S, Nye R. A. & van Poppel F. (2003) Fertility and Contraception During the 
Demographic Transition: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 34 (2), 141-154. 
Teitelbaum, M. S. (1972) Fertility Effects of the Abolition of Legal Abortion in Romania. 
Population Studies 26 (3), 405-417. 
United Nations (2017) Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
2017. “World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision” 12 June 2017. 
<https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ >. [Accessed 12th June 2017] 
Van de Kaa, D. (1987) Europe’s Second Demographic Transition. Population Bulletin 42 
(1), 3-57. 
Yi, Z. (1989) Is the Chinese Family Planning Program ‘Tightening Up’?. Population and 
Development Review 15 (2), 333-337. 
Yi, Z., Ping T, Gu B., Yi, X, Bohua L. & Yongpiing L. (1993) Causes and Implications of 
the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China. Population and 
Development Review 19 (2), 283-302. 
Zhang, Y., & Goza F. W. (2006) Who Will Care for the Elderly in China? A Review of the 
Problems Caused by China's One-Child Policy and Their Potential Solutions. 
Journal of Aging Studies 20, 151–164. 
 
